Market building and the Capital Markets Union : addressing information barriers in the SME funding market. by Schammo,  P.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
01 June 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Schammo, P. (2017) 'Market building and the Capital Markets Union : addressing information barriers in the
SME funding market.', European company and ﬁnancial law review., 14 (2). pp. 271-313.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2017-0014
Publisher's copyright statement:
The ﬁnal publication is available at www.degruyter.com
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 Market building and the Capital Markets Union: addressing information barriers in 
the SME funding market 
 
 
Pierre Schammo
*
 
 
February 2017 
 
forthcoming in (2017) European Company and Financial Law Review 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Capital Markets Union (CMU) is one of the flagship policy initiatives of the Juncker 
Commission. The Commission’s strategy for realizing a CMU is set out in its White Paper on 
building a CMU. Besides describing the Commission’s vision of a CMU, the white paper 
includes an action plan which details the measures that are needed to build a CMU. The aim 
of this article is to consider the Commission’s measures in one particular area of the action 
plan. Specifically, this article examines the Commission’s strategy for overcoming 
information barriers to SME investment. By acting in this area, the Commission’s objective is 
to facilitate access to finance, but also to diversify sources of funding for SMEs, which are 
traditionally heavily dependent on bank-based finance. This article evaluates the 
Commission’s strategy and its prospects of success. After assessing the relevant policy 
measures, it will argue for a paradigm shift which is based on three pillars: a greater 
emphasis on market building measures; a greater emphasis on information sharing duties as 
one mechanism that can help to address information barriers; and a market correcting 
strategy to dovetail greater market building.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The Capital Markets Union (CMU) is one of the Commission’s flagship projects. It is a 
policy initiative that is meant to be about market building. It is supposed to create the 
conditions for an integrated market for capital which complements the banking sector and 
helps to bring about a more diversified financial system. At the heart of the Commission’s 
market building strategy is its White Paper on building a CMU.
1
 The White Paper sets out a 
list of policy actions. These actions are meant to benefit a range of actors, notably small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs were among the victims of the financial crisis, 
especially as banks tightened their lending policies in the years that followed the financial 
crisis. Given SMEs’ importance for the real economy, SME funding has not surprisingly 
become a focus of attention for policy-makers around the world. Traditionally, SME funding 
is viewed as suffering from several problems. Among them are informational issues which 
affect both the funding demand side and the funding supply side. They make it more difficult 
for SMEs to navigate the funding market and identify funding options. They also make it 
harder for finance providers to assess the creditworthiness of SMEs. The White Paper 
attempts to offer solutions to these issues. Among its policy measures is a set of actions on 
‘overcom[ing] information barriers to SME investment’.2 The immediate objective of these 
measures is to improve access to finance for SMEs (a long-standing objective of the 
Commission), but also, crucially, to offer SMEs a more diverse range of non-bank funding 
options. This is in accordance with the White Paper’s broader objective of creating the 
conditions for the development of a more balanced financial system that is less based on 
bank-based finance.  
 
The aim of this article is to contribute to the literature on the CMU by considering the 
Commission’s market-building agenda under the White Paper.3 In particular, this article 
focusses on the SME funding market and the question of how to overcome the information 
barriers which the Commission identifies in its White Paper. The Commission’s ambitions 
are by no means small. There is a wealth of empirical research on the funding behavior of 
SMEs. Empirical data shows consistently that SMEs prefer bank-based finance to non-bank 
finance.
4
 Moreover, designing policy solutions for the SME funding market is complicated 
by the fact that SMEs are an eclectic group.
5
 They differ considerably in terms of their size, 
                                                 
1
 Commission (EC), ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’ COM(2015) 468 final, September 
2015).  
2
 Ibid 29.  
3
 D Valiante, Europe’s Untapped Capital Market: Rethinking Integration after the Great Financial Crisis 
(CEPS Paperback, Rowman & Littlefield International, London 2016); N Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance 
and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a “Big Bang”?’ (2016) 13 European Company and Financial 
Law Review 13(2) 376; N Moloney, ‘Capital Markets Union: Ever Closer Union for the EU Financial System?’ 
(2016) 3 European Law Review 307; N Dorn, ‘Capital Cohabitation: EU Capital Markets Union as Public and 
Private Co-Regulation’ (2016) 11 Capital Markets Law Journal 84; T Beck, ‘Does Europe need a Capital 
Markets Union? And How Would We Get There?’ in F Allen, E Carletti and J Gray (eds), The New Financial 
Architecture of the Eurozone (European University Institute, RSCAS, Florence School of Banking and Finance 
2015) 115; P Schammo, ‘Capital Markets Union and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs): a 
Preliminary Assessment’, in ibid, 137; K Lannoo, ‘Which Union for Europe's Capital Markets?’ (ECMI Policy 
Brief no. 22, February 2015) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2565722>; V Bavoso, 
‘Good Securitisation, Bad Securitisation and the Quest for Sustainable EU Capital Markets’ (2015) 30 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 221-225. 
4
 See, eg, Commission (EC), ‘Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE): Analytical Report 2016’, 
November 2016, p 108, <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/20403>.  
5
 See, eg, Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized entreprises [2003] OJ L124/36. According to the Commission Recommendation, SMEs, which category 
also includes microenterprises, are enterprises ‘which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual 
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growth ambitions, sectors of activity, etc. Generally, however, SMEs are especially sensitive 
to increases in regulatory burden. Moreover, the amount of external finance which SMEs 
require is relatively small. Empirical data shows that in the EU most SMEs will aim to obtain 
external funding of less than 1,000,000 euros in order to achieve their growth ambitions, with 
the largest proportion of SMEs (almost one out of four) anticipating that their funding needs 
will be in the range of 25,000 – 100,000 euros.6  
 
The main message of this paper concerns the White Paper’s policy actions on overcoming 
information barriers in the SME funding market. While the White Paper has ambitious policy 
objectives, I will argue that there is a certain disconnect in the White Paper’s thinking 
between problem definition and policy solution. Thus, I will argue that the Commission’s 
policy solution to overcoming information barriers is at risk of falling short of what is 
required to deal with informational issues. I will suggest that to overcome information 
barriers to SME investment a paradigm shift is needed, which is based on three pillars: a 
greater emphasis on market building; a greater emphasis on (quasi-mandatory) data sharing 
as one mechanism that can help to address information barriers; and a market correcting 
strategy that dovetails a market building strategy. 
 
In developing this line of argument, I will draw attention to several policy initiatives on 
quasi-mandatory data sharing that have emerged outside the CMU context: in the UK, but 
also at EU level. Banks will be among those that will be required to share data. I will describe 
these mechanisms as ‘quasi-mandatory’ because information sharing remains subject to a 
customer’s consent. I will argue that much can be learned from these initiatives. Recent 
efforts by the EU legislature to lower the prospectus disclosure burden to attract SMEs away 
from bank-based finance are unlikely to make a meaningful difference for most SMEs.  
 
This article proceeds as follows. Section II begins by identifying the market building 
narrative which underpins the CMU agenda. It will consider the CMU’s broad ambitions, and 
objectives, but also its limitations. Section III turns to the SME funding market and the 
information issues which affect it. It begins by setting out a framework for analysis, after 
which it considers the Commission’s strategy for addressing these issues. Having assessed 
the Commission’s approach, Section IV sets out my favoured approach. Section V concludes.  
 
 
II. The CMU: ‘market building’ for Member States 
 
To get a better sense of the CMU’s ambitions, I will begin by differentiating between two 
types of policies: market building and market correcting policies.
7
 Market building is about 
eliminating obstacles to market integration. In an EU context, market building is closely 
associated with the free movement provisions of the EU Treaties (negative integration), but 
                                                                                                                                                       
turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million’. 
Within this category, a small enterprise is ‘an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose 
annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 10 million’ and a microenterprise is ‘an 
enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total 
does not exceed EUR 2 million’. Note however that there is no universally accepted definition. See, eg, 
Schammo (n 3) 150-1.  
6
 SAFE (n 4) 114.  
7
 This dichotomy (market-building (or market-making) vs market-correcting) is found in the political science 
literature. See eg, F Scharpf, Governing in Europe – Effective and Democratic? (OUP, Oxford 1999) 45; E 
Posner and N Véron, ‘The EU and Financial Regulation: Power without Purpose?’ (2010) 17 Journal of 
European Public Policy 400.   
 4 
not exclusively since market building is also pursued through harmonisation (positive 
integration). Market correcting policies can be defined as measures whose purpose is to deal 
with the harmful or socially undesirable effects of unfettered markets. Thus, I will describe 
these measures loosely – by reference to their purpose – as re-regulatory. Admittedly, the 
distinction between these two types of policies is somewhat crude. Some authors add further 
distinctions: by differentiating between market correcting and market cushioning policies for 
example.
8
 Moreover, in many instances, policy measures combine aspects of market making 
and market correcting: for example, in the case of harmonisation.
9
 That said, the distinction is 
nevertheless a useful simplification. I feel free to put aside definitional subtleties because the 
distinction between market building and market correcting is good enough to capture the 
relevant traits of the CMU initiative.  
 
The CMU was presented as an initiative that is intrinsically about market building. Thus, the 
Commission White Paper describes the CMU as a typical internal market initiative: ‘a classic 
single market project’.10 The CMU is supposed to contribute to realising the EU’s long 
standing ambition of a single market for capital that will offer benefits to all the Member 
States: ‘a Capital Markets Union for all 28 Member States’.11 The emphasis is on breaking 
down barriers to free movement while staying clear of heavy institution-building and an 
overly prescriptive top-down re-regulatory agenda. As the Commission put it in its White 
Paper: ‘[t]he direction to take is clear: to build a single market for capital from the bottom up, 
identifying barriers and knocking them down one by one…’12  
 
Through market building, the CMU’s ambition is to bring about a more diversified financial 
system that is less reliant on the banking sector, and to stimulate growth, jobs and investment 
in a post financial crisis era – a core priority of the Juncker Commission.13 Specifically, by 
diversifying funding sources, a CMU is supposed to offer greater access to finance for 
businesses – especially for SMEs which have been heavily reliant on bank based finance. It is 
also meant to offer more investment opportunities and better returns for finance providers.
14
 
However, the CMU initiative is also supposed to contribute to financial stability by creating 
the conditions for greater and better private risk sharing through cross-border integration and 
financial diversification.
15
 The argument is that in the event of an economic shock affecting 
                                                 
8
 Eg, L Buonanno and N Nugent, Policies and Policy Processes of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2013), 14. See also D Kenealy, J Peterson and R Corbett, The European Union - How does it work? 
(OUP Oxford, 2015) 114.  
9
 See e.g. AG Maduro in Case C-58/08 Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform ECLI:EU:C:2009:596, para 8 who points out that if a common harmonisation provision 
such as Art 114 TFEU [Art 95 EC] were only about eliminating restrictions to the free movement, this would 
entail that such a provision ‘could promote market integration only through the deregulation of national markets. 
Such an interpretation would enshrine in Article [114] a particular policy preference when there is nothing in the 
Treaty to support such a view’.  
10
 Action Plan (n 1) 27.   
11
 Ibid 3.  
12
 Ibid 6.  
13
 J-C Juncker, ‘A New Start for Europe: my Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change’ 
(Strasbourg 15 July 2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf>.  
14
 Action Plan (n 1) 3.  
15
 There is support for the idea that a well-functioning CMU prima facie not only promotes growth (through 
better preference matching), but can also improve economic and financial stability (through greater private risk 
sharing). See N Anderson, M Brooke, M Hume and M Kürtösiová, ‘A European Capital Markets Union: 
Implications for Growth and Stability’, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 33, February 2015 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper33.pdf>. See also V 
Constâncio, ‘Capital Markets Union and the European Monetary and Financial Framework’ Chatham House, 21 
March 2016 <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160321_1.en.html>. See also C Furse, 
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an economy, increased private risk sharing enables losses to be spread across multiple 
jurisdictions, thus enabling the consequences of a shock to become more widely dispersed 
and thereby lowering the prospect of instability in the economy exposed to a shock.
16
 Market 
building under the CMU initiative has therefore several functions: to be growth enabling, but 
also stability enhancing.  
 
The Commission’s case for a stability enhancing CMU received support from influential 
actors. The ECB for example offered its support. Given the limitations of the ECB’s 
monetary policy for addressing country specific asymmetric shocks, the ECB sees benefits in 
a fully-fledged CMU which establishes conditions for increased private risk sharing.
17
 
However, the level of integration that is required to deliver a fully functioning CMU, which 
contributes through effective private risk sharing to economic and financial stability, is 
demanding to achieve.
18
 For one thing, it would require a truly level playing field. It would 
mean overcoming legal and extra-legal obstacles which have plagued the EU for so long,
19
 
including hurdles such as ‘home bias’ – that is, the disposition of investors to prefer their 
home market to other markets.
20
 It might require promoting equity over debt finance given 
that the former is seen as supporting a more desirable form of financial integration.
21
 Last but 
not least, integration is not a risk-free endeavour. High levels of integration come with risks 
which might defeat the very objectives that the Commission set itself: for example, the risk of 
capital flight,
22
 the risk of cross-border contagion and financial instability.
23
 In short, in the 
‘real world’, building a true CMU will be complicated to achieve and market building will, in 
and of itself, not be enough to address the risks of greater financial integration.  
 
To be sure, the CMU White Paper is not inimical to concerns about greater market building 
and risks to financial stability that typically call for market correcting measures. However, 
the CMU initiative was right from the beginning insulated from controversies linked to a 
prescriptive market correcting agenda. Thus the White Paper refers to several existing 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘Taking the Long View: How Market-Based Finance can Support Stability’ Bank of England speech, 28 March 
2014 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech718.pdf>. 
16
 Eg, Commission (EC), ‘European Financial Stability and Integration Review (EFSIR): a Focus on Capital 
Markets Union’ SWD(2016) 146 final, April 2016, 66 noting that ‘[a] well-functioning CMU will diversify and 
increase funding sources for the economy and strengthen its resilience. Truly integrated capital markets will also 
strengthen cross-border risk distribution, notably by deepening the integration of bond and equity markets. This 
will entail a broader dispersion of the impact of shocks. All this will contribute to increasing financial stability’. 
For a detailed assessment of the risk sharing argument, see Anderson et al. (n 15); Valiante (n 3).  
17
 Constâncio (n 15).  
18
 The point has been acknowledged. See eg, V Constâncio, ‘Monetary Policy and the European Recovery’ 
XXXI Reunión Círculo de Economía, Barcelona 30 May 2015 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150530.en.html>.  
19
 For a detailed assessment, see Valiante (n 3).  
20
 See generally K Lewis, ‘Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption’ (1999) 37 Journal of 
Economic Literature 571; C Pacchioli, ‘Is the EU Internal Market Suffering from an Integration Deficit? 
Estimating the “Home-Bias Effect”’ CEPS Working Document No. 348, May 2011.  
21
 Eg ECB, ‘Financial Integration in Europe’ April 2016, 82-83 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope201604.en.pdf>.  
22
 See eg, Anderson et al. (n 15), 19, highlighting the risk of capital flight during times of crisis, but noting that 
‘[e]xperience from the crisis suggests that fixed income assets covering both loans and bonds proved vulnerable 
to redenomination risk and capital flight. Other assets, notably equities, proved less vulnerable to this risk…’.  
23
 See generally, J Stiglitz, ‘Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May Be 
Undesirable’ (2010) 100 American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 388; J Stiglitz, ‘Capital Market 
Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability’ (2000) 28 World Development 1075, highlighting issues 
raised by short term capital flows in case of capital market liberalization.  
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measures (pre-CMU initiatives).
24
 It also highlights initiatives that are in progress elsewhere 
(e.g. CCP recovery and resolution) or that are supposed to be taken forward elsewhere 
(changes to macro-prudential tools which will be addressed in the context of the review of the 
European Systemic Risk Board).
25
 As far as supervision is concerned – the indispensable 
corollary of effective regulation – the White Paper (like the Green Paper) stays clear of 
controversy. It advocates strengthening supervisory convergence.
26
 As such, it does not 
meaningfully depart from the status quo. As far ESMA’s governance is concerned which is 
essential for ESMA to deliver its objectives, the White Paper notes that it will (together with 
matters concerning ESMA’s funding) be dealt with in a separate White Paper.27  
 
In trying to understand the White Paper’s approach to market correcting measures, the policy 
preferences of the UK are clearly important to flag up. The White Paper was published in 
September 2015; a demanding market-correcting agenda superimposed on the CMU market-
building policies would have been at loggerheads with several red lines for the UK, notably 
on further transfers of powers to the EU in the supervisory or resolution fields. However, 
clearly, since June 2016 the UK’s policy preferences for a CMU no longer matter that much. 
Indeed, since the UK’s referendum on the EU, subsequent communications on the CMU 
appear to signal a certain détente on market correcting policy aspects. Thus, the CMU 
initiative might well be the place where in the future more forceful action on EU day-to-day 
supervision is contemplated,
28
 thereby echoing suggestions made in the Five Presidents’ 
report, which suggestions the Commission had skilfully sidestepped in its CMU White 
Paper.
29
 It remains to be seen how much market correcting action will be injected into the 
market building agenda of the CMU. Clearly however the market building policy ambitions 
of the CMU will continue to contrast markedly with the market correcting orientations of its 
‘closest cousin’, the Banking Union.  
 
 
III. CMU market building in the SME funding market 
 
Section II described the general orientations and ambitions of the CMU initiative. It 
highlighted the challenges of effective market building, but also underlined its risks. This 
section zooms in on one area – i.e., SME funding – in order to consider how the CMU’s 
market building ambitions are translated into proposed actions. Facilitating access to finance 
for SMEs is among the CMU’s key aims. The Commission’s action plan resolves among 
other things to ‘overcome information barriers to SME investment’,30 a prerequisite for 
facilitating financial integration. I will begin this section by elaborating on the information 
                                                 
24
 Action Plan (n 1) 26.  
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ibid 27.  
28
 Day-to-day supervision involves vesting EU agencies such as ESMA with supervisory competence over 
market actors or activities. See eg, P Schammo, ‘EU Day-to-Day Supervision or Intervention-Based 
Supervision: Which Way Forward for the European System of Financial Supervision?’ (2012) 32 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 771.  
29
 Commission (EC), ‘Capital Markets Union – Accelerating Reform’ COM(2016) 601 final, September 2016) 7 
noting that ‘[t]he Five Presidents’ Report highlighted the need to strengthen the supervisory framework in order 
to ensure the solidity of all financial actors, which should lead ultimately to a single European capital markets 
supervisor. The Commission will consider, in close consultation with the European Parliament and the Council, 
the further steps in relation to the supervisory framework that are necessary to reap the full potential of CMU’. 
See also Commission (Five Presidents’ Report), ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ 12 
<https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf>.  
30
 Action Plan (n 1) 29.  
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issues that affect the SME funding market (1), after which I will assess the White Paper’s 
strategy for overcoming information barriers (2).   
 
1. Framework for analysis 
 
a. Problem definition: information barriers in the SME funding market  
 
Facilitating access to finance for SMEs has been a long-standing ambition of the EU. It has 
been a theme in many Commission communications, white or green papers.
31
 The CMU 
initiative is among the latest efforts in this area. Under the CMU, access to finance for SMEs 
has several connecting rationales: to better match supply and demand, but also to address 
structural vulnerabilities caused by Europe’s over-reliance on bank-based finance. Bank-
based finance has traditionally been the main source of external finance for SMEs. This has 
led SMEs to be over-exposed to tightening bank lending policies,
32
 but also, it has been 
reported, to lengthy lending decision-making processes which have contributed to dampening 
demand in the past.
33
 The fact that there is macro- or structural dimension to the issue of 
SME funding under the CMU is worth noting. It means that facilitating access to SME 
finance cannot be reduced solely to the question of whether the banking sector is willing or 
able to supply external finance to SMEs. Positive developments in the availability of bank 
finance for SMEs, which have been witnessed more recently,
34
 are not enough to lay the issue 
of SME funding to rest under the CMU agenda.
 
 
 
Clearly however creating a more diversified pan-EU financial system where SMEs are able 
and willing to look beyond the banking sector for external finance is a considerable 
                                                 
31
 Eg, Commission (EC), ‘Risk Capital: a Key to Job Creation in the European Union’ April 1998, 2 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/documentlibrary/30636641EN19.doc>; Commission (EC), ‘“Think Small 
First” – A “Small Business Act” for Europe’ COM(2008) 394 final, June 2008; Commission (EC), ‘An Action 
Plan to Improve Access to Finance for SMEs’ COM(2011) 870 final, December 2011; Commission (EC), 
‘Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan – Reigniting the Entrepreneurial Spirit in Europe’ COM(2012) 795 final, 
January 2013; Commission (EC), ‘A stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’  
COM(2012) 582 final, October 2012; Commission (EC), ‘Review of the “Small Business Act” for Europe’ 
COM(2011) 78 final, February 2011; Commission (EC), ‘Long-term financing of the European Economy 
COM(2013) 150 final, March 2013. The EU legislature too has sought to address the issue in various ways in 
the past. See eg, see rec (132) and art 33 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU [2014] OJ L 173/349; Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 April 2013 on European venture capital funds [2013] OJ L115/1; rec (44) and art 501 of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2013] 
OJ L176/1; Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on 
European social entrepreneurship funds [2013] OJ L115/18; Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing a Programme for the Competitiveness of 
Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME) (2014 - 2020) and repealing Decision No 
1639/2006/EC [2013] OJ L347/33. 
32
 Eg, G Wehinger, ‘Bank Deleveraging, the Move from Bank to Market-Based Financing and SME Financing’ 
OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends (Volume 2012/1), 1.  
33
 Institute of International Finance and Bain & Company, ‘Restoring Financing and Growth to Europe’s SMEs: 
Four Sets of Impediments and How to Overcome Them’ 2013, 4 
http://www.bain.com/Images/REPORT_Restoring_financing_and_growth_to_Europe's_SMEs.pdf.  
34
 Recent data on access to finance in the euro area suggests that availability of bank finance is improving. See 
ECB, ‘Survey on the Access to Finance of Entreprises in the Euro Area (October 2015 to March 2016)’ June 
2016, 18-20 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/accesstofinancesmallmediumsizedenterprises201606.en.pdf?c96d449
e601cbe6c87d2e67d54e68c70>.  
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challenge. For one thing, the banking sector is the most obvious choice for many SMEs. 
Empirical data shows consistently that SMEs prefer bank-based finance over non-bank 
finance.
35
 Raising finance on capital markets is particularly unattractive for many SMEs: for 
example, because of the cost associated with raising capital, because the decision to raise 
capital on such markets has implications for the business’s ownership/governance,36 or 
because SMEs are unwilling to make their information public: say, because revealing such 
information could benefit competitors.
37
 Admittedly, much effort is going into trying to lower 
cost and make a listing on a market, or for that matter, a public offer which is subject to 
prospectus regulation, more attractive to SMEs. However, given the amount of external 
finance that SMEs typically require for realising their growth ambitions, these efforts will 
only ever matter for a fraction of SMEs. Empirical data shows that in the EU most SMEs will 
aim to obtain external funding of less than 1,000,000 euros to achieve their growth ambitions, 
with the largest proportion of SMEs (almost one out of four) anticipating that their funding 
needs will be in the range of 25,000 – 100,000 euros.38  
 
That said, there are other complicating factors which stand in the way of better matchmaking 
in the SME funding market. Specifically, widening funding options for SMEs presupposes 
that informational issues which are present in the SME funding market are addressed.
39
 They 
hinder or complicate effective matchmaking between SMEs and finance providers; they 
might cause adverse selection.
40
 Information issues can affect the funding demand side 
(SMEs) and the funding supply side (finance providers). On the funding supply side, the 
supply of information for assessing the creditworthiness of an SME has proved to be 
inadequate.
41
 Information that is used for deciding on an SME’s creditworthiness typically 
includes non-financial information (eg business details), but also crucially financial 
information. The latter commonly includes information found in a business’ annual accounts, 
                                                 
35
 SAFE (n 4) 108, reporting that ‘[d]ebt financing in the form of loans is much more popular than financing 
through equity investments. In 2016, 64% of EU28 SMEs indicates that they prefer bank loans to finance their 
future growth ambitions and another 16% reported loans from other sources. Equity investment is the preferred 
type for 6% of SMEs. These proportions vary relatively little over the survey years since 2011. Only other 
alternatives are less popular in 2016’. 
36
 International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘SME Financing Through Capital Markets’ Final 
report, July 2015, 38 <https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD493.pdf>.  
37
 Ibid; O Yosha, ‘Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of Financing Source’ (1995) 4 Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 3.  
38
 SAFE (n 4) 114, which finds that 14% of SMEs look for funding of less than EUR25,000; 24% of SMEs look 
for funding of EUR25,000 to EUR100,000; 17% of SMEs look for funding of EUR100,000 to EUR250,000; 
17% of SMEs look for funding of EUR250,000 to EUR1,000,000; and only 13% look for funding in the range 
over EUR1,000,000. A remaining 14% was reported as ‘no answer/don’t know’. 
39
 There is plenty of empirical research on the topic, both at domestic level and at European level. See eg, 
Commission (EC), ‘Economic Analysis … on Building a Capital Markets Union’ SWD(2015) 183 final, 
September 2015, 43-45; Commission (EC), ‘European Financial Stability and Integration’ SWD(2015) 98 final, 
April 2015, 200-221; Competition & Markets Authority, ‘Retail Banking Market Investigation’ Final Report, 9 
August 2016 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57ac9667e5274a0f6c00007a/retail-banking-
market-investigation-full-final-report.pdf>. See also Breedon Review, ‘Boosting Finance Options for Business’ 
(2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32230/12-668-boosting-
finance-options-for-business.pdf>; Business Finance Taskforce ‘Supporting UK business’ (October 2010) 42, 
<https://www.betterbusinessfinance.co.uk/images/pdfs/Business_Finance_Taskforce_report.pdf>.  
40
 On adverse selection, see J Stiglitz and A Weiss, ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’ 
(1981) 71 American Economic Review 393. See also G Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488.  
41
 In the UK context, see HM Treasury, ‘Competition in Banking: Improving Access to SME Credit Data’ 
consultation, 15 December 2014 <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/competition-in-banking-
improving-access-to-sme-credit-data/competition-in-banking-improving-access-to-sme-credit-data>. At EU 
level, see ‘Economic Analysis … on Building a Capital Markets Union’ (n 39) 43-4.  
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information about its credit history, information on its repayment capacity and payment 
performance: that is, its positive payment performance (i.e., information about payments that 
were made) and negative payment performance (i.e., information about payments that were 
missed).  
 
However, informational problems are not just a funding supply side issue. They affect the 
demand side as well. SMEs are neither owned nor managed by omnipotent beings with 
perfect information and infinite computational capabilities. In the real world, many have 
issues navigating the SME funding market and are not sufficiently aware of the existence of 
the full range of available suppliers of external finance.
42
 Many do not ‘shop around’ when 
seeking external finance;
43
 indeed empirical research suggests that convenience, time and 
effort are important factors for explaining SMEs’ funding choices.44 Many SMEs lack the 
confidence to talk to alternative finance providers such as venture capitalists or equity 
financiers.
45
 Especially micro- or small enterprises may not be sufficiently experienced or 
educated on matters such as corporate finance or on how to present themselves and their 
businesses to financiers,
46
 which may affect the prospect of them reaching out to alternative 
providers of finance. Even if they do reach out, it may affect their prospect of securing 
finance. Finally, the number of potential funding choices might also work against SMEs by 
obscuring the best funding choice and making them less able to choose.
47
  
 
Information barriers in the SME funding market are generally seen as working to the benefit 
of banks. Admittedly, there are noteworthy differences between banks in Europe. They differ 
                                                 
42
 Eg, AFME and the Boston Consulting Group, ‘Bridging the Growth Gap: Investor Views on European and 
US Capital Markets and How they Drive Investment and Economic Growth’ (2015) 30 
<http://www.afme.eu/en/reports/publications-and-data/publications/bridging-the-growth-gap>; ‘Economic 
Analysis … on Building a Capital Markets Union’ (n 39) 44. See also British Business Bank, ‘Small Business 
Finance Markets 2014’ <http://british-business-bank.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/BBB_Small-Business-
Finance-Markets-2014_Online_Interactive.pdf> (finding an increase in awareness about alternative sources of 
finance, but noting that in comparison to bank finance, awareness is still lower).  
43
 Eg, ‘Retail Banking Market Investigation’ (n 39) xxv-xxvi; BMG Research and Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills, ‘Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) Journey Towards Raising External Finance’ 
October 2013, 1, <http://british-business-bank.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/SME-Journey-Towards-
Raising-Finance.pdf>.  
44
 Retail Banking Market Investigation’ (n 39) 299; ‘Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) Journey 
Towards Raising External Finance’ (n 43) 1, noting that ‘[m]ost SMEs spend less than an hour considering their 
finance options and less than an hour filling in the application forms’.  
45
 SAFE (n 4) 105. 
46
 Eg Minutes of the CMU workshop on advisory support for SME access to finance (Brussels, 12-13 September 
2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/events/2016/0912-workshop-advisory-support-sme/docs/160912-
minutes_en.pdf> noting that ‘[r]esearch confirms a lack of awareness and understanding of alternative finance 
among entrepreneurs’ and ‘… SMEs should be better prepared to dialogue with alternative lenders and investors 
– the difficulty to properly draft a business plan was repeatedly cited …’. In the UK, see eg, Department for 
Business Innovation & Skills (Institute of Employment Studies), ‘SME Lending and Competition: an 
International Comparison of Markets’ BIS Research Paper No. 270, May 2016, 15 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522490/bis-16-105-small-and-
medium-sized-enterprise-lending.pdf> noting that ‘SMEs are, in the main, relatively unsophisticated in terms of 
their financial accounting and expertise, and this encourages a preference for basic banking and lending 
requirements’; Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘SME Access to External Finance’ BIS 
Economics Paper no. 16, January 2012, 8, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32263/12-539-sme-access-
external-finance.pdf>.  
47
 In the literature, see eg, R Thaler and C Sunstein, Nudge – Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and 
Happiness (Penguin Books, London 2009) 83-4; C Sunstein, ‘Behaviorally Informed Regulation, Part 1’ in R 
Frantz, S-H Chen, K Dopfer, F Heukelom and S Mousavi (eds), Routledge Handbook of Behavioral Economics, 
(Routledge, Abingdon 2017) 199, 200-1.  
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in terms of their type (eg multinational/global commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative 
banks), their risk appetite, their client focus, their approach to ratings, etc. However, at the 
risk of generalising, banks commonly have several advantages over other finance providers. 
At the outset, they have an infrastructure (a branch network) that facilitates access to SMEs. 
Often they also benefit from an ongoing relationship with SME customers. This relationship 
may produce information over time and across different banking services (loans, current 
accounts, credit card accounts, etc.).
48
 The information helps banks to reduce information 
asymmetries. It might lead to efficiency gains. However, it might also lead to information 
monopolies which may ‘lock in’ customers and allow banks to extract informational rents 
from borrowers (e.g. higher interest rates).
49
  
 
Hence, besides gaining information because of their lending business, banks will typically 
gain information by providing additional services such as current accounts. This additional 
information will add to their comparative advantage.
50
 For example, by accessing current 
account data, a bank will be able to gain information on how an account performs and 
behaves over time:
51
 for example, by monitoring movements of funds in and out of the 
account; by watching maximum/minimum account balances or overdraft limits (eg, whether 
and for how long overdraft limits are exceeded). This type of data can be very valuable for 
assessing the creditworthiness of a business.
52
 Often it offers the first signs of financial 
stress.
53
 In case of smaller businesses, where publicly available information on the financial 
performance and the trading activities is missing, current account data can be especially 
valuable.
54
  
 
Admittedly, there are differences in terms of the amount or type of information that banks 
collect (eg, raw quantitative data, qualitative data, soft data) and related thereto the 
investment, in terms of time and effort, which banks make for collecting and processing such 
                                                 
48
 A Boot, ‘Relationship Banking: What do we Know?’ (2000) 9 Journal of Financial Intermediation 7, 11; H 
Degryse, ‘Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data’ 
(2000) 9 Journal of Financial Intermediation 90, 93. 
49
 There is a large literature on the topic. Note that the theoretical and empirical literature offer mixed messages 
as to the benefits and costs of relationship banking. For representative contributions see eg, D Diamond, 
‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’ (1984) 51 Review of Economic Studies 393; A Berger and 
G Udell, ‘Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance’ (1995) 68 Journal of Business 351; 
‘Relationship Banking: What do we Know?’ (n 48); R Rajan, ‘Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between 
Informed and Arm’s-Length Debt’ (1992) 47 Journal of Finance’ 1367; M Petersen and R Rajan, ‘The Benefits 
of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data’ (1994) 49 Journal of Finance 3; C Schenone, 
‘Lending Relationships and Information Rents: do Banks Exploit Their Information Advantage?’ (2009) 23 
Review of Financial Studies 1149; J Santos and A Winton, ‘Bank Loans, Bonds and Information Monopolies 
across the Business Cycle’ (2008) 63 Journal of Finance 1315; G Hale and J Santos, ‘Do Banks Price Their 
Informational Monopoly’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 185; G López-Espinosa, S Mayordomo and 
A Moreno, ‘When Does Relationship Lending Start to Pay?’ (2016) Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2016.11.001>. 
50
 ‘Relationship Banking: What do we Know?’ (n 48); ‘Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System’ (n 
48). 
51
 Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, ‘Evaluation of Market Practices and Policies on SME Rating: 
Final Report’ 18-9 <http://www.european-
microfinance.org/docs/news/Study%20on%20SME%20rating%20and%20scoring.pdf>.  
52
 See in this context, ‘Competition in Banking’ (n 41) noting that ‘SME current account data is the most 
valuable source of data in assessing the creditworthiness of an SME’. 
53
 Bank of England, ‘Should the Availability of UK Credit Data be Improved’ Discussion paper, May 2014, 13 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2014/dp300514.pdf>.  
54
 ‘Retail Banking Market Investigation’ (n 39) 401. See also ‘When Does Relationship Lending Start to Pay?’ 
(n 49) 3 noting that SMEs ‘tend to generate much less public information, they have lower quality financial 
statements, and they are often not audited nor studied by professional analysts’.  
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information.
55
 However, it is worth noting that most of what I will say below concerns only 
raw (or quantitative) data as opposed to soft data or qualitative data.
56
 Raw data can be 
further broken down into ‘provided data’ and ‘observed data’. ‘Provided data’ is information 
that is provided by a customer, for example, when applying for a bank loan. It includes for 
example information about the amount of funding that an SME seeks or the type of finance 
facility that it requests. ‘Observed data’ is information that can be observed from the use 
which a customer makes of a bank service (eg, balance movements in an online current 
account or credit card account). Raw data can be distinguished from ‘inferred data’ such as 
internal credit scores. Inferred data is data which a bank creates by using information relating 
to its customers (quantitative data, qualitative data), but which involves further analysis and 
processing by a bank.
57
  
 
b. Designing a strategy for addressing information barriers in the SME funding market 
 
A major question for an SME funding strategy that has as objective to diversify sources of 
funding and widen access to finance is how to improve the flow of information in the SME 
funding market. In a capital markets context, information asymmetries are typically 
addressed by way of disclosure regulation. However, as noted above, only a fraction of SMEs 
will be interested in raising finance on capital markets and many SMEs will be unable or 
unwilling to incur the cost associated with prospectus or ongoing disclosure duties. One 
complicating factor is that outside the capital markets/IPO context, there is less agreement 
among Member States on the paradigms, rules or institutions that are needed to address 
information barriers. Hereinafter, I will focus on information sharing as a mechanism for 
improving the availability of SME information. My aim is to identify and discuss key aspects 
of an information sharing strategy that helps to mitigate informational issues which affect 
SMEs and finance providers. By information, I mean mainly raw (or quantitative) data. 
Insights can be drawn from a variety of sources including empirical findings and national 
initiatives.  
 
i. Public sector versus market driven approaches to sharing SME information 
 
As noted, there is no single approach to sharing SME information at Member State level. 
Information such as credit data can for example be shared through credit registers that are 
maintained by public authorities such as central banks or financial supervisors.
58
 However 
information sharing can also take place by establishing privately owned credit bureaus or 
credit reference agencies.
59
 At least some of the differences at Member State level appear to 
reflect cultural or historical preferences. In France, for instance, credit data is available 
through the Banque de France. It maintains a central credit registry which collects data on 
                                                 
55
 For details, see ‘Evaluation of Market Practices and Policies on SME Rating’ (n 51). 
56
 See ibid 16-21, for details on the distinction between quantitative and qualitative data.  
57
 I am loosely adapting distinctions that were drawn elsewhere. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
‘Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability’, 16/EN WP 242, 8 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-51/wp242_en_40852.pdf>; OECD, 
‘Working Party on Security and Privacy in the Digital Economy, Protecting Privacy in a Data-Driven Economy: 
Taking Stock of Current Thinking’ DSTI/ICCP/REG(2014)3, May 2014, 5 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=dsti/iccp/reg%282014%293&doclan
guage=en>. 
58
 ‘Should the Availability of UK Credit Data be Improved’ (n 53) 5. 
59
 Note that public and private initiatives are not necessarily compatible: for example, because of ‘crowding out’ 
effects. See T Jappelli and M Pagano, ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets: a Survey’ Centre for Studies in 
Economics and Finance, Working Paper no. 36, March 2000, 17 <http://www.csef.it/WP/wp36.pdf>.   
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business loans above a certain threshold, allowing lenders who have access to the registry to 
make more informed lending decisions.
60
 On the other hand, jurisdictions such as the UK are 
at the forefront of a market driven approach to disseminating SME information. Private 
sector credit reference agencies (private credit bureaus) have long been in place in the UK. 
They collect financial and non-financial information from various sources and use this data to 
offer analytical or information services to their clients.
61
 Credit reference agencies are 
however not the only actors in the market for SME information in the UK. The UK 
legislature recently adopted the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
(SBEE Act) which makes provision for the establishment of private sector ‘finance 
platforms’.62 The role of these platforms is to bring finance providers and SMEs together. To 
facilitate this matchmaking process, finance platforms receive specified information about the 
funding needs of SMEs from designated banks. The latter will share this information in case 
where an SME’s finance application with a (designated) bank proved unsuccessful63 and the 
(unsuccessful) application related to a loan, an overdraft, a credit card, an invoice discounting 
or factoring agreement, a hire purchase or finance leasing agreement.
64
 The information 
which a finance platform receives relates inter alia to the amount and type of funding sought, 
the length for which the SME has been operating and receiving income, information 
regarding contact details, legal structure and the funding timetable.
65
 Finance platforms are 
designated by the UK government. Currently all of them are part of the Fintech sector. They 
are online platforms; they are essentially comparison sites.
66
  
 
Finance platforms are expected to become key players in the market for SME information. 
They change the dynamic between borrower and funder. Once information is referred to 
finance platforms, SMEs are essentially put in a reactive mode: while they remain in control 
of the process via consent requirements,
67
 the initiative rests with the finance platform and its 
panel of lenders.
68
 SMEs are no longer required to actively search for finance alternatives. 
Instead, finance providers search for funding opportunities via finance platforms. Hence 
finance platforms provide prima facie a way to address or to mitigate issues which I 
highlighted above and which affect the funding demand side: for example, a lack experience 
in navigating the SME funding market or in approaching alternative finance providers; or 
simply an unwillingness on the part of SMEs to invest time and effort in researching finance 
options. 
 
The provisions on finance platforms are supposed to work in tandem with a second measure 
that was adopted in the SBEE Act. Section 4 of the Act seeks to address information 
asymmetries in the SME funding market by improving access to credit information which is 
                                                 
60
 Note that the Banque de France also produces ratings of businesses’ creditworthiness. See ‘Should the 
Availability of UK Credit Data be Improved’ (n 53) 37.  
61
 Ibid 12.  
62
 SBEE Act, s. 5. See also the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations 2015 [SI 
2015/1946].  
63
 Note that ‘unsuccessful’ is a defined term. For details, see text to notes 101-103.  
64
 The Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations 2015, reg 2(1). The relevant 
agreement must be denominated in sterling.  
65
 Schedule of The Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations 2015.  
66
 Three platforms have been designated so far: <https://www.fundingxchange.co.uk>; 
<https://www.fundingoptions.com>; <https://www.businessfinancecompared.com>. 
67
 The SME’s consent is required at the stage where a bank offers a referral to its customers. It is also required 
where a finance provider, which is a member of the finance platform’s lending panel, requests access to the 
SME’s identifying information.   
68
 This is not to say that SMEs might not be asked to provide additional information on top of the information 
specified in the regulations. Presumably such information can be collected through the platform’s online portal.  
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shared through credit reference agencies. Thus, under section 4, designated credit rating 
agencies will receive SME credit information from designated banks.
69
 The information in 
question relates to loans made to the business, as well as data relating to credit card accounts 
or current accounts held in the name of the business.
70
 Under the scheme, designated credit 
reference agencies will pass on this information to finance providers, provided the latter meet 
certain requirements.
71
 As in the case of finance platforms, information sharing is subject to 
the consent of the SME to which the information pertains.
72
  
 
The UK’s preference for a market driven approach to information sharing is also apparent in 
the case of the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). As part of its retail banking 
market investigation, it concluded that informational advantages of incumbent banks in the 
UK had contributed to affect competition in the SME funding market.
73
 In response, the 
CMA adopted a series of measures. These include a requirement made to the largest retail 
banks to adopt an open API banking standard. APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) 
are standards which make it possible for software components to interact with each other and 
to share data.
74
 An open API banking standard is expected to advance technological change 
in the banking sector and crucially to make it easier for bank customers to share account 
information such as their transaction history with third parties who they trust.
75
 According to 
the CMA, it will offer customers greater control of their banking arrangements; it will 
facilitate competition and offer a stimulus to private sector innovation. Moreover, the CMA’s 
set of measures also includes a requirement made to banks to support Nesta. The latter is an 
independent charity which is launching a ‘challenge prize’ in order to identify, through a 
competitive process, new solutions that will help SMEs to improve access to information on 
banking services.
76
 Here too, it is apparent that the CMA wishes to promote innovation and 
market driven solutions to information problems.  
 
ii. Mandatory versus voluntary information sharing:  
 
Closely related to the above issues is the question of whether information sharing should be 
voluntary or whether it should be mandatory. At the outset, it is worth noting that information 
duties can be placed on several different actors. Prima facie, an obvious starting point is to 
rely on SMEs to improve information asymmetries by voluntarily disclosing information. For 
example, in a world without disclosure regulation, SMEs that wished to raise capital on 
public markets could simply of their own volition make information about their business, 
their financial situation, etc. public and thus signal to markets that they are worth financing.
77
 
                                                 
69
 For details, see the Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations 2015 [SI 2015/1945]. 
70
 For details on the information that must be referred, see the schedule of the Small and Medium Sized 
Business (Credit Information) Regulations 2015.  
71
 For details, see Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations 2015, reg 6. See also text 
to notes 90-91 below.  
72
 The Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations 2015, reg 3(2), reg 5 and reg 
6(1)(b).  
73
 For a summary, see ‘Retail Banking Market Investigation’ (n 39) xix-xxxiv.  
74
 Open Data Institute and Fingleton Associates, ‘Data Sharing and Open Data for Banks: a Report for HM 
Treasury and Cabinet Office’ September 2014 16, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382273/141202_API_Report_F
INAL.PDF>.  
75
 ‘Retail Banking Market Investigation’ (n 39) xxxvii-xxxviii.  
76
 Ibid xlv.  
77
 M Fox, ‘Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles’ (2016) 66 Duke Law Journal 
673, 687. 
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Likewise SMEs might simply of their own volition supply credit information to alternative 
finance providers.  
 
Of course, however, all is not that simple in the real world. For one thing, if information is 
provided voluntarily by an SME, it may still be difficult to use such information if it is not 
independently verified. More generally, an SME is unlikely to have the right incentives to 
disclose all the relevant information about its business or its financial situation.
78
 Mandatory 
reporting requirements help to mitigate this type of issue. However, increasing reporting 
requirements has a cost and this point has special resonance in an SME context. This is 
because SMEs tend to be particularly sensitive to increases in regulatory burden. Indeed, 
empirical surveys suggests that regulation is among the more pressing issues for SMEs – in 
fact, a more pressing issue than access to finance in recent surveys.
79
 Unsurprisingly, there is 
a reluctance in policy circles to add to the regulatory burden of SMEs. SMEs’ greater 
sensitivity to regulatory burden is also acknowledged in initiatives such as the ‘Think Small 
First’ principle whose ambition is (inter alia) to keep the regulatory burden imposed on SMEs 
in check.
80
  
 
Admittedly, there are other ways to address information barriers in the SME funding market. 
One way is to turn to those that hold and collect information about SMEs. Banks might for 
example voluntarily share credit information about their SME customers. This voluntary 
sharing might take place via private sector credit bureaus or, as in the UK, through private 
sector credit reference agencies. There is a rich literature in finance and economics on 
information sharing via credit bureaus. This literature seeks to elucidate the causes and 
effects of information sharing via credit bureaus – either theoretically (and at times in a 
highly stylized form) or empirically. It suggests, inter alia, that information sharing through 
credit bureaus contributes to reducing adverse selection by helping lenders to identify good 
from bad borrowers.
81
 It might discipline borrowers who fear the negative consequences of a 
lender sharing bad news (ie, borrower default information) with other lenders.
82
 It might also 
reduce borrowers’ incentives to borrow excessively from multiple lenders.83  
 
Hence the literature associates several benefits with voluntary information sharing 
arrangements. But it also reports complications and possible drawbacks. For one thing, 
information sharing can make lenders vulnerable to greater competition if it eliminates their 
information advantages. Hence, in competitive markets, lenders may be less likely to share 
                                                 
78
 In a credit market context, see eg, A Karapetyan and B Stacescu, ‘Information Sharing and Information 
Acquisition in Credit Markets’ (2014) 18 Review of Finance 1583, 1588 (noting that a business is unlikely to 
disclose negative information). Note that the issue of mandatory versus voluntary disclosure has a long history 
in the securities disclosure field. Among common arguments in favour of mandatory disclosure is that 
businesses may be unwilling to voluntarily disclose certain information: for example, information which could 
benefit their competitors (see eg, ‘Truly New Securities’ (n 77) 687; M Fox, ‘The issuer choice debate’ (2001) 2 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 563, 570). 
79
 SAFE (n 4) 134-5.  
80
 ‘Think Small First’ (n 31). See also Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making [2016] L123/4 
(highlighting the need for impact assessments to have ‘particular regard to SMEs’).  
81
 ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets: a Survey’ (n 59) 10-11; M Pagano and T Japelli, ‘Information 
Sharing in Credit Markets’ (1993) 48 Journal of Finance 1693.  
82
 ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets: a Survey’ (n 59) 11. 
83
 Ibid 12-13. A Bennardo, M Pagano and S Piccolo, ‘Multiple Banking Lending, Credit Rights, and 
Information Sharing’ (2015) 19 Review of Finance 519. 
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information.
84
 However, it has also been suggested that voluntary information sharing via 
credit bureaus may stymie competition if it can be used ‘as a collective tool’ by incumbents 
to prevent challengers to enter the market, leaving the latter at a ‘strong informational 
disadvantage’.85 In the UK, the government appears to have drawn somewhat similar 
conclusions. As noted earlier, the sharing of credit information is organized around credit 
reference agencies in the UK. However, important SME credit information was only shared 
in closed user groups on a like-for-like basis. Thus, a company which shares credit 
performance information would only be entitled to ‘information of the same level that they 
contribute …’.86 The benefits of these arrangements came under scrutiny in a number of 
high-level reviews, notably because they allowed closed user groups which are organized 
around specific products – eg, business current accounts – to refuse to share data with market 
entrants that are not able – as opposed to unwilling – to supply like-for-like information.87 
The government decided to take action, considering that the lack of access to credit 
information constituted a barrier to entry into the market for SME funding.
88
 Section 4 of the 
SBEE Act was introduced and the Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) 
Regulations 2015, which flesh out the requirements of section 4, were subsequently adopted. 
I presented the provisions above. Suffices to add that under these provisions designated banks 
must (subject to an SME customer’s approval) refer specified credit information about an 
SME customer to designated credit reference agencies.
89
 The latter are in turn by law 
required to share this information with finance providers who meet a number of 
requirements. Among these requirements is that the SME has consented to the information 
being shared; that the finance provider agrees to the standard terms of the credit reference 
agency; and that it uses the information only for the purposes specified in the regulations.
90
 
Importantly the finance provider must agree reciprocally to share ‘all credit information’ that 
it holds about its – consenting – SME customers with the credit reference agency.91 However, 
the regulations do not require like-for-like sharing. Hence, over time, credit reference 
agencies will be fed information by a variety of actors. Designated banks will be able to 
benefit from this as well.  
 
Another nail in the coffin of voluntary information sharing in the UK are the CMA’s 
measures on retail banking. Recall that the CMA’s measures require the largest retail banks 
to adopt an open API banking standard. The aim is to put customers in a position where they 
can seamlessly share account information with other finance providers. These measures will 
benefit SMEs as well. Except for the bank customer’s consent, very little manual input will 
presumably be required from a customer to share account data with third party applications.  
 
That said, information barriers are not just affecting the supply side. They affect SMEs as 
well. Recall in this context that section 5 of the SBEE Act makes provision for the 
establishment of finance platforms. Recall also that these platforms are fed information about 
                                                 
84
 M Brown and C Zehnder, ‘The emergence of information sharing in credit markets’ (2010) 19 Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 255; ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets (1993)’ (n 81).  
85
 ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets: a Survey’ (n 59) 19. 
86
 ‘Should the Availability of UK Credit Data be Improved’ (n 53) 12, noting further that ‘if a lender only 
contributes negative credit information (ie that pertaining to defaults or other adverse credit events) they will 
only be able to access negative credit information from the [credit reference agency].’  
87
 Ibid 12. For details, see also ‘Competition in Banking’ (n 41).  
88
 ‘Competition in Banking’ (n 41).  
89
 The Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations 2015, reg 3. 
90
 Reg 6.  
91
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the funding needs of SMEs by designated banks. The basic mechanism which underpins this 
information sharing process is a mandatory referral obligation. In essence, a designated bank 
is by law required to share information about an SME customer’s funding needs where it 
declines to offer funding to its customer and the latter consents to its information being 
shared. The adoption of these arrangements followed attempts by banks to self-regulate. 
Thus, in 2010, a number of high street banks committed to a set of measures aimed at SME 
customers that had failed to secure funding with them. These commitments were set out in a 
taskforce report which concluded that: 
 
‘Customers need to know what to do, and where to go, if the bank declines a credit 
application or offers an alternative finance solution. The Taskforce banks have agreed 
to commit to providing proactive and clear information on what alternative sources of 
finance and other help might be available. … Our signpost initiative sets out the 
minimum standard of service customers will get, either verbally or in writing. If their 
loan application is unsuccessful, they will be told why and they will then be guided to 
alternative sources of help and advice, including how to improve their 
creditworthiness. …’.92 
 
However, these commitments failed to deliver sufficiently meaningful results.
93
 It is plain 
that banks had few incentives to facilitate a process of financial diversification for SME 
customers. Ultimately, this experience only strengthened the authorities’ case for enacting a 
mandatory referral scheme.  
 
Hence, the UK is clearly vigorously pursuing initiatives that require banks to share 
information. These arrangements are quasi-mandatory: banks are subject to information 
sharing duties, but information sharing remains subject to the agreement of the bank’s 
customer. Unlike other countries where mandatory information sharing typically takes place 
via credit registries which are maintained by public authorities, the above measures differ in 
two important respects: first, the information that is shared extends to information about the 
funding needs of SMEs; second, information is shared, subject to an SME’s consent, via 
private actors: credit reference agencies or finance platforms.  
 
Admittedly, mandatory information sharing might raise issues too. Jappelli and Pagano for 
example, suggest that mandatory information sharing may ‘kill relationship lending’.94 
According to the authors, this is because mandatory sharing may discourage banks to invest 
in screening and monitoring activities, which are central to relationship banking, if others can 
free ride on their efforts.
95
 They note that mandatory sharing is unlike voluntary information 
sharing where banks can decide to only share some of their information or simply not share at 
all.
96
 On the other hand however, Karapetyan and Stacescu suggest that when hard 
information is shared, banks’ incentives to invest in the acquisition of soft information that 
cannot be communicated reliably (eg, information such as whether a manager is honest or 
hard working), will increase.
97
 Thus, they note that incumbents ‘overall knowledge’ of their 
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 Report of the Business Finance Taskforce, ‘Supporting UK business’ October 2010, 42 
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 For details, see ‘Capital Markets Union and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises’ (n 3). 
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 ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets: a Survey’ (n 59) 15.  
95
 Ibid.  
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 Ibid.  
97
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information, the authors refer to M Peterson, ‘Information: Hard and Soft’ (draft paper, July 2004), 3 
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 17 
borrowers may increase under information sharing arrangements and that such arrangements 
may in fact result in deeper relationships ‘with likely positive welfare effects’.98  
 
Hence, the literature offers contrasting conclusions. At any rate, in the case of the UK, it is 
plain that concerns about possible negative effects did not prevent efforts to increase bank 
information sharing requirements. The policy objectives – especially improving competition 
and access to finance for SMEs – outweighed any potential concern about the effects of 
information sharing on the banking sector. That is not to say that these information sharing 
arrangements are limitless. As far as credit information is concerned, it is apparent that only 
certain types of raw data must be shared.
99
 There is for example no requirement to share 
inferred data such as credit scores. Moreover, the arrangements only target the largest banks 
in the UK.
100
 The mandatory referral obligation, which attempts to remedy informational 
issues affecting SMEs, has also been calibrated to only apply to the largest banks and only 
where an SME customer’s application for bank finance is ‘unsuccessful’. This will be the 
case where a designated bank simply decides to reject a customer’s finance application. It 
also covers the situation where the bank offers its customer a finance facility ‘on a different 
basis’, which its customer goes on to reject for reasons which do not concern the fees or 
interests that the bank wishes to charge.
101
 In other words, the mandatory referral obligation 
will not apply if a customer rejects a finance offer because of pricing reasons (i.e., fees or 
interest rate).
102
 Hence, the policy measure is not targeted at SME customers that seek access 
to finance at a lower cost. However, it will apply to SMEs that are potentially fundable, but 
whose application is rejected by a bank because, say, it does not fit its risk appetite. The 
mandatory referral scheme offers these SMEs the prospect of finding finance for projects that 
might otherwise have been lost. As far as designated banks are concerned, it has been 
                                                                                                                                                       
information which is neither initially available in hard numbers (the ability of the manager, their honesty, the 
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(ECB Working Paper Series No 1555, June 2013) 
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99
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100
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2015’ 
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101
 The Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations 2015, reg 2(3)(b). 
102
 Arguably, this may also offer banks a way to evade their obligation to refer an SME customer. Instead of 
simply rejecting an application, a bank might thus decide to offer a finance facility at an interest rate which it 
anticipates a customer will reject.  
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suggested that they might also stand to benefit from referral duties: since it is not uncommon 
for banks to offer SMEs a range of services (eg, current accounts), the relationship between a 
designated bank and an SME will not necessarily be cut off. If an SME is able to grow as a 
result of successful investments, it may well return to its bank at a future date in order to seek 
funding at a lower cost there.
103
 Designated banks may of course also decide to join a 
platform if it is in their commercial interest to do so. 
 
It remains to be seen how effective the UK arrangements will prove to be, whether they will 
meet their objectives and what impact they will have on the banking sector. For the present 
purposes, suffices to note that there are ways to calibrate information sharing duties and that 
calibration is prima facie the way forward for dealing with any possible concerns over such 
duties.
104
  
 
iii. Advice and Education  
 
How best to support SMEs through advice and education is another key consideration for 
designing a strategy that addresses information barriers. Education and advice has several 
dimensions. On the one hand, it is education and advice to improve the odds of an SME 
finding funding (‘business support’). However, as information sharing becomes increasingly 
seamless (eg, through open API functionality), education and advice is increasingly also 
about addressing security and confidentiality risks (‘business awareness’).105  
 
Consent requirements have an important role to play in addressing confidentiality issues.
106
 
However, relying on the consent of a person or a business to legitimize information sharing is 
not always the answer: for example, because a financial transaction history includes data 
pertaining to third parties (so-called ‘silent parties’) who will not have given their consent to 
information sharing.
107
 Finding solutions to these issues requires careful consideration of the 
enabling or constraining effects of the law.
108
 Practical steps might need to be taken. For 
example, one solution, which has been tried out in the UK in relation to silent parties is to 
redact the ‘transaction description’ field in financial transaction records.109 It might also be 
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 Finance platforms have noted that alternative finance providers are unlikely to be able to compete with banks 
on pricing. See Funding Options, ‘CMA Retail Banking Market Investigation: Working Paper on SME 
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104
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‘The Open Banking Standard’ (n 105) para 8.4.3.3.  
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possible to address concerns by only sharing key measures of account performance 
(minimum balance, maximum balance, average balance, etc.). 
 
In delivering business support and business awareness, both the public sector and the private 
sector have prima facie a role to play. As far as business awareness is concerned, the Open 
Banking Working Group, a group of industry experts who were put in charge of developing a 
framework for an open API banking standard in the UK, concluded that the responsibility 
should be shared between several actors: banks, the FinTech sector, consumers, business 
groups and the public sector.
110
 As far as business support is concerned, various national 
schemes appear to co-exist. I have queried elsewhere whether this diversity is necessarily 
beneficial.
111
 Indeed, besides national schemes, the EU also seeks to play a role in this field 
through the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN). The latter operates at national level through 
its member organisations.
112
 However, the EU has also tried to contribute to business support 
in other ways: for example, by adopting Article 431(4) of the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR).
113
 The latter is a feedback provision. It requires banks, ‘if requested, [to] 
explain their rating decisions to SMEs and other corporate applicants for loans …’. Prima 
facie, it is a useful educational measure. It replaced former Article 145(4) of the Capital 
Requirements Directive which equally required banks to provide feedback if requested.
114
  
 
2. Information issues in the SME funding market: the Commission Approach  
 
At this stage, it seems useful to summarise some of the findings so far. I began this section by 
highlighting key issues affecting the SME funding market and which complicate 
matchmaking between SMEs and finance providers. Specifically, I identified informational 
issues on both the funding supply side and the funding demand side. Next, I discussed several 
key considerations for the design of a strategy aimed at addressing these barriers: the role of 
the public sector versus the role of the market; mandatory versus voluntary information 
sharing; and the importance of education, as a means to provide business support but also 
ensure business awareness. The aim of this part is to use these insights to consider the 
Commission’s approach to overcoming information barriers. Recall that ‘[o]vercom[ing] 
information barriers to SME investment’,115 is among the areas which the Commission’s 
CMU action plan singles out. I will begin by considering the Commission Green Paper, after 
which I will turn to the White Paper.  
 
a. The Commission Green Paper  
 
The CMU Green Paper was the Commission’s first step in defining a market building agenda 
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111
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115
 Action Plan (n 1) 29.  
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for a CMU.
116
 As a green paper, it was followed by a consultation and subsequently by a 
white paper which set out the Commission’s action plan for building a CMU. The Green 
Paper identified a wide range of issues and areas for possible action. In particular, it 
identified information issues on the funding demand and funding supply side. Informational 
issues on the supply side were identified as a priority area for early action. Thus, the 
Commission noted that: 
 
‘[t]ypically, information on SMEs is limited and usually held by banks … Improving 
credit information would help build an efficient and sustainable capital market for 
SMEs’.117  
 
Regarding information issues that affect the funding demand side, the Green Paper touched 
on several problems, including on the question of financial reporting standards for SMEs.
118
 
However, it also addressed the role of banks in offering feedback to SME customers or in 
advising them on possible alternative funding options:  
 
‘[b]anks could be encouraged to provide better feedback to SMEs whose credit 
applications are declined and to raise awareness about alternative financing 
opportunities for SMEs whose credit was declined’.119  
 
The Green Paper represented the Commission’s ‘early thinking’ on a CMU and as a green 
paper, its suggestions were merely indications of a possible future agenda. Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s suggestions had a number of noteworthy features. In particular, the 
Commission’s suggestions on improving bank feedback and on helping SMEs to identify 
alternative sources of funding were couched in the language of self-regulation. The Green 
Paper showed little awareness of the likely conflict of interests which banks face when asked 
to support a process of financial diversification. It was also noteworthy that the Green Paper 
made no mention of Article 431(4) CRR. As we saw earlier, this provision requires banks, if 
requested, to explain their rating decisions for loans. Finally, the Green Paper did also not 
refer to the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN). Recall that the EEN is part of the EU’s 
business support strategy.  
 
b. The Commission White Paper  
 
The White Paper which followed the Green Paper was informed by a consultation process 
which saw considerable interest.
120
 Unsurprisingly, the White Paper was better informed. The 
EEN was mentioned and Art 431(4) CRR was referenced.
121
 The Commission White Paper 
also recognized the need for a ‘comprehensive strategy’ to deal with information barriers in 
the SME funding market.
122
 Specifically, the White Paper identified three pillars for an SME 
strategy: better bank feedback; support and advice for SMEs; and better access to 
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information/improved matchmaking.
123
  
 
However, the Commission appeared to continue to favour self-regulation and best practice on 
various aspects of this strategy. For example, on the provision of bank feedback on rejected 
credit applications, the Commission noted in its first status report on the CMU White Paper 
that:  
 
‘[t]he Commission Services have asked leading European banking associations to 
look at ways to strengthen banks’ feedback to SMEs applying for credit by promoting 
best practices recently developed in some Member States across the EU’.124  
 
Article 431(4) CRR, which requires banks, if requested, to explain their rating decisions for 
loans, was not given much attention. Although the White Paper referred to the provision 
(albeit in a footnote), the Commission stayed clear of suggesting that more effective 
monitoring and enforcement of the application of Article 431(4) CRR (former Article 145(4) 
CRD) was in order. This is so even though the implementation of the provision appeared in 
most cases to have been unsuccessful.
125
  
 
On advice and support for SMEs, the preference for supporting best practice is apparent as 
well. Thus, the Commission committed in its White Paper to ‘map existing local or national 
support and advisory capacities across the EU in order to promote best practices…’.126 On 
better access to information/improved matchmaking, the Commission suggested to 
investigate the possible establishment of ‘pan-European information systems’ whose purpose 
would be to connect existing national systems. Here too, the Commission seemed to prefer 
encouraging best practice. In its first status report, it thus noted that:  
 
‘[t]he Commission Services will also support the development of information systems 
to help small businesses to navigate new funding opportunities more effectively. The 
intention is to promote best practices in delivering relevant information to firms 
which could benefit from alternative funding sources and seek to build pathways 
between the most successful national or regional support platforms’.127  
 
It is also noteworthy that the White Paper no longer prioritized action on SME credit 
information; recall that the latter was among the suggested areas for early action in the Green 
Paper. In the White Paper, suggestions on facilitating access to credit information were made 
together with the Commission’s proposal on pan-European information systems. Specifically, 
the White Paper suggested that a pan-European system could enable SMEs to share credit 
information with investors at EU level on a voluntary basis, provided that there was 
‘sufficient comparability of key data’.128 However, few details were given about the so-called 
pan-European information systems. Nor were there any details in the White Paper on how 
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SMEs would disseminate information via pan-EU platforms.  
 
By concentrating on the need to promote best practice, the Commission appears to have 
answered some of the tougher and controversial questions in the negative: in particular, 
whether a bank should be required (as opposed to encouraged) to take a more active role in 
helping an SME customer to identify alternative sources of funding in case where it rejects its 
customer’s application.  
 
In summary, it appears that the CMU strategy on overcoming information barriers is mostly a 
soft strategy which aims to support Member State actions and to encourage the banking 
sector as well as industry/business organisations to find solutions. Time will tell whether this 
strategy will make a difference. However, it does not appear to meaningfully depart from the 
status quo. Nor does this strategy recognize the conflict of interests which banks will 
naturally face when asked to support a process of financial diversification that is supposed to 
benefit their SME customers.  
 
 
IV. CMU market building in the SME funding market: a paradigm shift  
 
Given that the Commission’s thinking on how to address information barriers in the SME 
funding market still appears to be somewhat in flux, the aim of this final section is to make a 
number of recommendations on how the Commission’s strategy could develop. In short, I 
will argue in favour of a paradigm shift which is based on three pillars: first, a greater 
emphasis on market building measures (1); secondly, a greater emphasis on policies of 
(quasi-mandatory) information sharing (2); and thirdly, a greater emphasis on market 
correcting measures to dovetail a market building agenda (3). In making these proposals, my 
aim is to encourage a deeper discussion on the type of measures that are required to deliver 
the CMU’s objectives.  
 
1. Information barriers in the SME funding market require market-building measures   
 
As noted, the Commission’s strategy on overcoming information barriers to SME investment 
has several features: it rests on diffusing best practice and on supporting Member State 
initiatives. None of the CMU action points on ‘overcom[ing] information barriers to SME 
investment’ commits the Commission to true market-building measures, such as for example 
a proposal that requires, as opposed to encourages, greater SME information sharing.  
 
Yet, there is clearly a case to be made for going beyond promoting best practice and consider 
the role and place of ‘market building’ (legislative) measures.129 Information barriers such as 
the one that I described earlier affect both the funding demand side and the funding supply 
side: they make it more difficult for SMEs to identify and access sources of external finance; 
they make it harder for alternative finance providers to accurately assess investment 
opportunities. Importantly, they also hinder new actors from entering the market for SME 
information and SME funding. They affect competition and lead to inefficiencies in the 
allocation of credit/funding. To be sure, the severity of such information barriers is likely to 
vary between Member States. Recall that Member States adopt very different approaches to 
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information issues affecting the SME funding market. However, such diversity is also likely 
to affect the establishment or the functioning of an internal market for SME funding by 
reinforcing market fragmentation.
130
  
 
To be sure, several objections can be leveled against my argument. A first objection is that 
most SMEs are simply not interested in a cross-border market for SME funding. If an SME 
requires finance, it will prefer to find finance locally or nationally. The second objection is 
that under the CMU initiative market building measures have in fact been adopted with a 
view to removing information asymmetries and facilitating market integration. Hence, some 
might take the view that I misinterpret the reality of market building under the CMU. I will 
consider each of these objections in turn. 
 
The first objection is essentially about ‘home bias’. The point is that SMEs, like investors, 
suffer from home bias. However, even if a majority of SMEs continue to be affected by home 
bias, the point is that other actors may well be interested in cross-border opportunities. 
Specifically, improving the flow of information is likely to encourage the emergence of a 
new tier of information service actors which will have incentives to operate on a pan-EU 
basis. Hence, while SMEs might continue seeking finance domestically, they might in doing 
so still benefit from information services offered by pan-EU information actors that operate 
both domestically and abroad. With respect to the second objection, it is indeed worth 
acknowledging that market-building measures have been adopted in the context of the CMU. 
Only recently, the EU legislature adopted a new Prospectus Regulation (PR).
131
 Disclosure 
regulation has been the method of choice – especially in a capital markets/public offer 
context – for dealing with information asymmetries and for facilitating market integration. 
Given the CMU’s ambition to diversify the financial system and since disclosure regulation 
has been a major plank of the EU’s strategy to reduce information asymmetries, it did not 
come as a surprise that the CMU White Paper called for early action on prospectus 
regulation.
132
 The PR testifies to the EU’s attempt to ease the disclosure burden for SMEs. 
The regulation is set to replace the Prospectus Directive which was adopted in 2003 and 
provides for the drawing up, approval and publication of a prospectus in case where a 
company seeks to raise capital on a regulated market or where it offers securities to the 
public.
133
 Attempts were made in the past to reduce administrative costs of issuers. It was a 
core theme of the 2010 Prospectus Amending Directive.
134
 However, the outcome of these 
reforms was at best mixed.
135
 The PR is a fresh attempt to make EU prospectus regulation 
                                                 
130
 The Commission noted itself that the absence of standardised and available credit information acts as a 
‘significant barrier’ to SME investment; it considered action in this area to be a prerequisite to offer SMEs more 
funding choices. See ‘Economic Analysis … on Building a Capital Markets Union’ (n 39) 44.  
131
 At the time of writing the regulation has not yet been published in the Official Journal. However, the 
compromise text agreed between the European Parliament and the Council is available at 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15574-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf>. 
132
 Attempts to ease the regulatory burden in the wake of the financial crisis can be witnesses elsewhere as well. 
See ‘Truly New Securities’ (n 77) 676.  
133
 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC [2003] OJ L345/64 (as amended).  
134
 Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending 
Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market [2010] OJ L327/1, recs (1)-(4).  
135
 Commission (EC), ‘Review of the Prospectus Directive’ Consultation Document, 18 February 2015, 13 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/prospectus-directive/docs/consultation-document_en.pdf> 
noting that the proportionate disclosure regime is ‘perceived as too burdensome’.  
 24 
more SME friendly. The regulation attempts to do so in different ways. First of all, the PR 
seeks to limit the reach of the obligation to prepare a public offer prospectus by carving out a 
prospectus free space for companies that wish to raise relatively small amounts of capital.
136
 
Thus, public offers of less than 1,000,000 euros will be outside the scope of the regulation.
137
 
Crucially, even though Member States can insist on disclosure duties for such offers under 
national law, Member States will not be able to use national law to require the publication of 
a prospectus in accordance with the requirements of the regulation, or otherwise impose 
disclosure duties on issuers that constitute a disproportionate or unnecessary burden.
138
 By 
adopting this provision, the PR seeks to prevent Member States from imposing extensive 
disclosure duties through the national backdoor. Secondly, for issuances that are within the 
scope of the directive (eg, because they are above 1,000,000 euros), the new regulation 
attempts to make prospectus regulation more SME friendly by providing for a new ‘EU 
growth prospectus’ which will (inter alia) be available to SMEs which contemplate making a 
public offer.
139
 The disclosure burden associated with this new type of prospectus is expected 
to be lighter. According to the PR, a growth prospectus is supposed to be a document in 
‘standardised format, written in a simple language and which is easy for issuers to 
complete’.140 The precise content of the new EU growth prospectus remains to be fleshed out.  
 
While the objectives of the PR are laudable, it is plain that prospectus regulation, as a means 
to overcome information asymmetries, will continue to matter only for a fraction of SMEs. 
Indeed, because of the limited funding needs of most SMEs – recall that the funding needs of 
most SMEs are below 1,000,000 euros – prospectus regulation will most of the time not be 
the tool for dealing with information asymmetries in the SME funding market, or for that 
matter, for building a pan-EU SME funding market.
141
 Outside the prospectus space, 
information barriers will need to be addressed by other means.  
 
2. A greater emphasis on policies of (quasi-mandatory) information sharing 
 
Designing a regulatory strategy on information barriers in the SME funding market is clearly 
rich in challenges. The fact that many SMEs are particularly sensitive to increases in 
regulatory burden is one such challenge. The fact that the types of businesses that are treated 
as SMEs vary considerably in size, capitalization and orientation; that they operate in very 
different sectors; and that they have widely differing funding needs and funding preferences 
is another challenge. Disclosure requirements are certainly part of the answer to information 
asymmetry problems, but they are not the answer given compliance cost issues. In fact, given 
the characteristics of the SME segment, it is unlikely that a single solution for dealing with 
information issues will emerge. Yet even in parts of the SME funding market where 
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 These provisions do not apply yet. I examined the existing provisions in P Schammo, EU Prospectus Law – 
New Perspectives on Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets (CUP Cambridge, 2011) 88-9.  
137
 Draft PR, art 1(2a). Note that the regulation also allows Member States to exempt domestic public offers of 
up to 8,000,000 euros from the obligation to publish a prospectus. See draft PR, art 3(2).  
138
 Draft PR, art 1(2a). 
139
 Draft PR, art 15. To benefit of the EU growth prospectus regime, an issuer must not have securities admitted 
to trading on a regulated market. There are other provisions that might benefit a proportion of SMEs: eg, the 
provisions on a simplified disclosure regime for secondary issuances (see draft PR, art 14).  
140
 Draft PR, art 15(1).  
141
 It is worth noting that the PR makes it possible to voluntary opt into the regulation in case of a public offer of 
less than 1,000,000 euros. An issuer will as a result become subject to the requirements of the new regulation, 
but it will also benefit from the prospectus passport rights (see draft PR, art 4). However, in practice, it is 
doubtful that this opt-in arrangement will raise much interest given the cost associated with prospectus 
regulation.  
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extensive disclosure duties are not the answer to information asymmetries, progress can be 
made by improving the availability and sharing of SME information. Such information is 
likely to come from a variety of sources. One such source is the banking sector.  
 
It is apparent that significant developments on information sharing (that is, sharing of ‘raw’ 
information) are underway in the banking and financial sector.
142
 We saw earlier that the UK 
is at the forefront of these efforts. It took action under the SBEE Act. Recall also that the 
CMA is requiring banks to implement an open API banking standard which, once 
implemented, should make it possible for customers to share account information with third 
party providers in a seamless manner. Admittedly, in the UK, competition concerns provided 
a powerful rationale for acting on information barriers and for justifying the cost of 
implementing information sharing arrangements. The aim is to encourage competition 
between banks and alternative finance providers, but also between the former and challenger 
banks. As far as the CMU is concerned, I already noted that the White Paper had no ambition 
to mandate banks to share information. Nor is encouraging competition part of the CMU 
White Paper’s problem definition on information barriers in the SME funding market. 
Encouraging competition is part of the general ambitions of the CMU and a focus of attention 
in other specific areas, such as retail financial services.  
 
That said, efforts to facilitate information sharing are not just underway at national level. In 
fact, the EU is also making inroads in this field, but outside the CMU context. Specifically, 
the second Payment Services Directive (PSD2), which was adopted in 2015 and which 
Member States are required to implement by 2018, brings within its regulatory scope new 
types of services such as payment initiation services and account information services.
143
 The 
latter are services, accessed via online interfaces, which provide their users with aggregated 
information on one or several payment accounts held with one or several payment service 
providers (banks, for our purposes).
144
 Account information service providers are a type of 
aggregator.
145
 They collect and consolidate information relating to payment accounts, but to 
provide this service they must have access to these accounts. The PSD2 sets conditions and 
requirements for the exercise of this activity. However, it also seeks to remove barriers that 
have hindered the provision of account aggregator services.
146
 Moreover, the PSD2 allows 
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 I described the meaning of raw data earlier (see text to notes 55-56).  
143
 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment 
services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ L337/35.  
144
 PSD2, rec (28). See also the definition of account information services in art 4(16).  
145
 On aggregators, see S Madnick and M Siegel, ‘Seizing the Opportunity: Exploiting Web Aggregation’ 
(2002) 1 MIS Quarterly Executive 35; Deloitte ‘The Impact of Innovation in the UK Retail Banking Market – a 
Final Report for the Competition and Markets Authority’ (July 2015), 38-49, 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/55ba0461ed915d155c000013/The_impact_of_innovation_in_th
e_UK_retail_banking_market__2_.pdf>.  
146
 See PSD2, art 36 which requires Member States to make sure that account information service providers (as 
a type of payment institution; see art 33(2)) have access to credit institutions’ payment accounts services on an 
‘objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate basis’ and that such access is sufficient for them to provide 
their services in an ‘unhindered and efficient manner’. See also art 67 which seeks inter alia to ensure that 
payment service users have the right to make use of services that enable access to account information. It also 
ensures that access to account information cannot be made conditional on a contractual relationship between the 
account information service provider and the account servicing payment service provider (art 67(4)). Note that 
the right to make use of such services only applies for payment accounts that are accessible online (art 67(1)). 
Various conditions must be satisfied regarding confidentiality and security. Among other things, the provision 
of the service presupposes that the user has given her ‘explicit consent’ (art 67(2)(a)).  
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account information service providers to operate on a pan-European basis by granting them 
passporting rights.
147
  
 
There are other significant EU developments that are worth flagging up. The general right to 
data portability, which was enacted in Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), is one such development.
148
 Essentially, data portability allows an individual (a 
‘data subject’) to obtain his/her personal data that s/he provided to a so-called data controller 
‘in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format’.149 Thus, data portability 
allows a person to reuse his/her data, but it also includes the right to transmit such data to 
another controller ‘without hindrance’.150 Where technically feasible, the data subject can 
have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another.
151
  
 
Neither the PSD2, nor the GDPR are yet applicable at national level. The former must be 
implemented by 13 January 2018 and the implementing measures must apply from this 
date.
152
 The GDPR will apply from 25 May 2018.
153
 At the time of writing many details 
remain to be fleshed out. Questions about how to operationalize the above requirements (eg, 
by using an API?)
154
 or how to deal with the concerns of ‘silent parties’ will need to be 
clarified.
155
 However, the more important point for our purposes is that the above measures – 
that is, those adopted or to be adopted in the UK as well as the measures adopted under the 
PSD2 or the GDPR – represent significant developments on information sharing. They seek 
to empower customers, and promote competition and innovation. They are part of a wider 
trend of facilitating and regulating information or data sharing in the digital age. Seen against 
this background, the CMU action points on information barriers in the SME funding market 
appear markedly out of step. Indeed, the CMU White Paper is silent on the information 
sharing policies that were enacted under the PSD2 or the GDPR. Thus, my second suggestion 
is that the Commission engages with the policies on information sharing duties that are 
developing outside the CMU context – in the UK and at EU level – when defining a CMU 
specific strategy on information barriers.  
 
To be sure, EU action that is taken outside the CMU context will prima facie benefit SMEs as 
well. However, not all of the EU information sharing provisions will be applicable to SMEs 
and none of them is specifically tailored to the issues which SMEs face when seeking 
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 PSD2, art 28, rec (48).  
148
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.  
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 GDPR, art 20(1). See also rec (68). ‘Data controller’ is defined in art 4(7) as a ‘natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data…’.  
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 GDPR, art 20(1).  
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 GDPR, art 20(2).  
152
 PSD2, art 115(1) and (2). Some provisions derogate from this timetable: see art 115(4).  
153
 GDPR Art 99(2).  
154
 In relation to the data portability provision of the GDPR, the Article 29 Data Working Party, which offers 
guidance to the Commission, suggested that one approach would be to make an API available (see ‘Guidelines 
on the Right to Data Portability’ (n 57) 15). In relation to the PSD2 provision, see also European Banking 
Authority, ‘Consultation Paper on the Draft Regulatory Technical Standards Specifying the Requirements on 
Strong Customer Authentication and Common and Secure Communication under PSD2’ EBA-CP-2016-11, 12 
August 2016.  
155
 See in this context GDPR art 20(4) which underlines that the right to data portability cannot prejudice the 
‘rights and freedoms of others’. See also the proposals made by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
‘Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability’ (n 57).  
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external finance.
156
 Recall that addressing barriers to SME investment requires addressing 
information issues on the funding demand and supply side. In the UK, the provisions of the 
SBEE Act on information sharing offer a solution which is specifically targeted at SMEs. The 
provisions on mandatory referrals and finance platforms help SMEs to navigate the SME 
funding market whilst the provisions on sharing SME credit information offers a wider set of 
key indicators of creditworthiness.
 157
  
 
Admittedly, implementing a more forceful approach to information sharing at EU level – 
especially a mandatory referral system – will face objections: for example, because of 
competition concerns, because of costs associated with updating legacy IT systems, because 
of costs associated with data standardisation; because of ‘free rider’ concerns, because of 
differences between national banking markets, etc. However, as already noted, information 
sharing as I contemplate it here only involves sharing raw data. This data can presumably be 
collected mechanistically through electronic means and will not include analytical input by a 
bank. Thus, it is not inferred data; it is not proprietary to a bank. Indeed, in the case of natural 
persons who are protected by data protection legislation, raw data (say, current account data) 
would be considered to be personal data of a bank customer. Moreover, while IT systems 
would need to be adapted in order to deal with new information sharing duties, the fact is that 
banks are already collecting and sharing information electronically and will be required to do 
more in the future.
158
 To be sure, there is a need for a deeper reflection on how information 
sharing obligations would work; what their scope should be and how to deal with any 
legitimate concerns. Recall that there are ways to calibrate information sharing. It might 
mean restricting certain requirements to certain types of banks (as in the UK). Calibrating 
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 The PSD2 provisions on access to account information services will be available to SMEs. The PSD2 
definition of payment service user includes both natural persons and legal persons (art 4(10)). However, the 
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considered as relating to natural persons ‘on their own merits’. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
‘Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data’ 01248/07/EN WP 126 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf>. 
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 In comparison to payment account information under the PSD2, the credit information that designated banks 
must provide pursuant to s. 5 of the SBEE Act is more extensive. For example, it includes information relating 
to a loan (see for details the Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations 2015). It is 
unlikely that a loan account would be deemed a payment account (i.e., an account ‘for the execution of payment 
transactions’ according to PSD2, art 4(12)). In this sense, see Financial Conduct Authority Handbook 
PERG15.3 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/15/3.html>. 
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 Think for example of the PSD2 or the GDPR provisions on data sharing. The European Central Bank’s 
AnaCredit project will also require banks to share a substantial amount of information in a standardised form. 
AnaCredit is a project that seeks to establish a dataset ‘containing detailed information on individual bank loans 
in the euro area, harmonised across all Member States’. See 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money_credit_banking/anacredit/html/index.en.html>. 
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information sharing duties might also involve considering whether information access fees 
are justified in order to address concerns of the banking sector. Hence, there are issues that 
will require a fuller discussion. However, at the very least, a CMU strategy on information 
barriers ought to consider how to maximize the benefits of information sharing mechanisms 
that are already enacted in EU law, especially the PSD2 provisions on information services 
which will also benefit SMEs, or the GDPR provision on data portability which is much more 
general in scope than the provision of the PSD2, but which only applies to personal data of 
natural persons.
 159
 
 
3. More effective action on information barriers needs a strategy on market correcting 
measures that dovetails market building measures  
 
If the EU deems that more significant inroads in the field of information sharing are 
warranted, a CMU strategy with dovetails greater market building with market correcting 
measures will be required. Promoting data sharing is not a risk-free endeavor. There are risks 
involved in making information more widely available. Security risks or confidentiality risks 
are an obvious concern. But there is a myriad of other risks that require careful 
consideration,
160
 including reputational risks for banks and at the apex of the risk pyramid, 
risks to financial stability. More generally, pursuing policies that encourage innovation is not 
risk free. There is good and bad innovation; the financial crisis offers evidence of the 
consequences of leaving the latter unaddressed. Moreover, greater competition might cause 
banks to take greater risks:
161
 for example, if they face greater competition brought about by 
greater information sharing.
162
 Measures will need to be put in place in order to address 
concerns. That said, market correcting intervention is not just about addressing risks. 
Regulation and supervision will contribute to building trust in information sharing and 
thereby contribute to ensuring that it can deliver its full potential.
163
  
 
Managing risks will be a common effort. SMEs will have a role to play; hence the importance 
of ensuring business awareness. Consent requirements will need to be put in place in order to 
protect SMEs’ information (eg, SME credit information, account information or information 
about an SME’s funding needs). General data protection legislation will typically only apply 
to personal data of natural persons.
164
 Regulatory and supervisory solutions will also be 
needed. Specifically, monitoring and supervision will be required in order to deal with the 
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 See also (n 156). Note that the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party suggested that ‘provided data’ and 
‘observed data’ (as opposed to ‘inferred data’) should be covered by the data portability requirement of the 
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 See in this context, Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, ‘Joint Committee Discussion 
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 Greater competition might lower incentives to act prudently with respect to risks (see M Keeley, ‘Deposit 
Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking’ (1990) 80 American Economic Review 1183). However, the 
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Nicoló, ‘The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited’ (2005) 60 Journal of Finance 1329; D 
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55 Journal of Finance 679. 
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 ‘Information Sharing in Credit Markets: a Survey’ (n 59) 16.  
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 ‘The Open Banking Standard’ (n 105) para 4.3.1.  
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 See also note 156 above.  
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potential risks of greater information sharing and its possible impact on the banking sector 
and beyond. Some sort of authorization or registration scheme will be required for actors 
dealing in SME information sharing. However, solutions should be proportionate to the risks 
of information sharing. For instance, information sharing does not require holding client 
funds. Therefore, it does not raise the same concerns as these latter activities.
165
 The extent of 
regulatory and supervisory intervention will of course also depend on what other activities 
information services actors carry out.  
 
However, it is worth repeating that outside the CMU context efforts are already being 
invested in regulating information sharing duties. It is plain that a CMU market correcting 
strategy on SME information sharing should engage with these developments. Indeed, recall 
that SMEs will be able to benefit from the provisions on account information services, 
irrespective of whether the business is run as a legal entity, a partnership or by a sole trader 
(an individual, self-employed person).
166
 What is more, the PSD2 not only seeks to facilitate 
account information services; it seeks to regulate them. Account aggregation services already 
existed before the PSD2 was adopted, although aggregators faced obstacles in exercising 
their activity.
167
 The EU legislature took the view that account information services should be 
brought within the scope of the PSD2 to offer greater protection and legal certainty.
168
 The 
PSD2 sets conditions and requirements to the exercise of this activity. Thus, the PSD2 
extends data protection requirements to the provision of account information services.
169
 
Account information service providers will need to be registered (but not authorized) and will 
be subject to prudential supervision.
170
 They will need to hold professional indemnity 
insurance or a comparable guarantee.
171
 They will need to comply with security rules and 
standards. EBA is currently working on the draft technical standards which will flesh out the 
provisions of the PSD2.
172
 It will have an important role to play in determining whether and 
where to make trade-offs: trade-offs between security and innovation; or between promoting 
user-friendly solutions, and safe and secure solutions; or between promoting innovation and 
preventing fragmentation if differing market solutions emerge.
173
 
 
Much can also be learned from the UK’s initiatives. In fact, the UK’s approach, which relies 
on designated finance platforms and designed credit reference agencies, offers a much more 
managed approach to SME information sharing. I have already discussed the mechanisms 
                                                 
165
 See in this context PSD2, rec (35) noting that ‘it would be disproportionate to impose own funds 
requirements’ on account information service providers. In the UK, the provision of credit data on companies is 
not a ‘regulated activity’ for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. See Financial 
Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook, EG 19.33.2, available at 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/EG/19/?view=chapter. The exercise of this activity does therefore 
not attract the same level of regulatory scrutiny.  
166
 Recall that the PSD2 applies to natural and legal persons. On the other hand, the data portability provision of 
the GDPR will only apply to personal data of natural persons. See note 156 for details. 
 
167
 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Cash Savings Market Study Report: Part I: Final findings, Part II: Proposed 
remedies’ January 2015, 85 noting that ‘many banks’ terms and conditions prohibit the sharing of such 
information by customers to third parties’ <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/market-studies/cash-savings-
market-study-final-findings.pdf>.  
168
 PSD2, rec (28).  
169
 The provision of this service is inter alia subject to the explicit consent of the payment service user (PSD 2, 
Art 67(2)(a)).  
170
 PSD, Art 33. 
171
 PSD2, rec (35); art 5(3).  
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August 2016. 
173
 Ibid 6.  
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which underpin these arrangements. Suffices to add here that finance platforms do not require 
authorization from the FCA.
174
 However, safeguards were put in place in order to offer SMEs 
a measure of protection and ensure that they remain in control of the information sharing 
process. Thus, finance platforms must be designated by the UK government (the Treasury) 
which can also revoke their designation.
175
 Before designating a finance platform, the 
Treasury consults the British Business Bank, a government owned bank, which carries out 
due diligence on applicants (eg, on the existence of systems and processes for data handling, 
on whether an applicant holds relevant regulatory authorisations).
176
 The FCA will exercise 
oversight and enforcement powers over finance platforms in accordance with the provisions 
of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations 2015. 
Furthermore, finance providers will only gain access to information referred to a platform if 
they join the platform’s panel of lenders. This will presuppose that they meet the platform’s 
terms and conditions.
177
 SMEs are meant to stay in control of the referral process through 
specific consent requirements. Thus, an SME, which is offered a referral to a finance 
platform by a designated bank, must consent to its information being referred. Furthermore, 
finance providers which are members of the platform’s panel will in the first instance only 
gain access to information in anonymous form. They will only be able to ask for identifying 
information about an SME applicant if the latter consents to such information being 
provided.
178
  
 
Gaining access to SME credit information is also a managed process under the SBEE Act and 
the Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations 2015. Like finance 
platforms, credit reference agencies will require designation by the Treasury in order to 
benefit from section 4 of the SBEE Act. To be designated, the credit reference agency will 
need to meet the requirements of the implementing regulations, notably on data handling.
179
 
Credit reference agencies which seek designation will be subject to a due diligence process 
carried out by the British Business Bank. Once designated, sharing of credit information 
between a designated bank and designated credit reference agencies is subject to the 
agreement of the bank’s SME customer.180 The latter’s consent will also be required when a 
finance provider requests such information from a designated credit reference agency.
181
 It 
will presuppose (inter alia) that the finance provider agrees to the standard terms of the 
designated credit reference agency.
182
 Furthermore, the FCA will have enforcement and 
oversight responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of the regulations.
183
 Crucially, 
the regulations apply (and where necessary extend) protections afforded to SMEs against 
incorrect information held by designated credit reference agencies.
184
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180
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V. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article was to contribute to the ongoing debate on a CMU. It first looked at 
the general orientations of the CMU, after which it turned to the contemplated actions in the 
SME funding/information market. With respect to overcoming information barriers to SME 
investment, I submitted that there was a certain disconnect in the White Paper’s thinking 
between problem definition and policy solution. I argued for a paradigm shift based on three 
pillars: a greater emphasis on market building measures; a greater emphasis on information 
sharing duties as one mechanism that can help to address information barriers; and a market 
correcting strategy that dovetails a market building strategy. When considering information 
sharing arrangements, I submitted that a CMU strategy on overcoming information barriers 
should consider the SBEE arrangements that were adopted in the UK. I highlighted the fact 
that information sharing obligations could be calibrated in order to address legitimate 
concerns, but I argued that at the very least, a CMU strategy ought to consider how to 
maximize the benefits of information sharing provisions that were adopted under the PSD2 or 
the GDPR. I argued for an approach which sought to improve access to finance and financial 
diversification, but which also had regard to the benefits of innovation and greater 
competition. When considering market correcting aspects, I acknowledged the potential 
drawbacks of information sharing obligations. I identified various types of risks and 
underlined the importance of monitoring the effects of greater information sharing and 
competition on the banking sector. Ultimately, I drew attention to the fact that the UK 
approach, which relies on designated finance platforms and designated credit reference 
agencies, offered a much more managed approach for dealing with SME information sharing, 
which could help to address concerns.  
